

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

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FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2971

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 SALT TWO GENEVA 0048

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E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR JOHNSON'S STATEMENTS OF MARCH 10, 1976

(SALT TWO-932)

THE FOLLOWING ARE TWO STATEMENTS DELIVERED BY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON
AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF MARCH 10, 1976.

BEGIN STATEMENT ONE

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON

MARCH 10, 1976

MR. MINISTER,

I

THROUGHOUT THESE NEGOTIATIONS TO PREPARE AN AGREEMENT BASED
UPON THE VLADIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING, THE U.S. DELEGATION HAS EMPHA-
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SIZED THE IMPORTANCE IT ATTACHES TO THE VERIFICATION OF COMPLI-

ANCE WITH THE LIMITATIONS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT. ONE OF THE AGREED PRINCIPLES UPON WHICH THESE NEGOTIATIONS ARE BASED IS THAT LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS MUST BE SUBJECT TO ADEQUATE VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS.

IN ADDITION TO THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE XVI WITH RESEPECT TO VERIFICATION, THE UNITED STATES HAS PROPOSED ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS CONCERNING VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE MIRV LIMITATION OF THE NEW AGREEMENT. THESE ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS ARE DIRECTED AT SOLVING PROBLEMS RELATED TO THE ABILITY ADEQUATELY TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE WITH THE MIRV LIMITATION OF THE NEW AGREEMENT BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. THESE PROVISIONS ARE CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPH 6 OF ARTICLE II, WHICH DEFINES AN ICBM, SLBM, AND ASBM EQUIPPED WITH A MIRV SYSTEM; IN THE PROTOCOL WHICH WAS TABLED AS PART OF THE U.S. DRAFT OF MARCH 5, 1975; AND IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF ARTICLE V, WHICH RELATES THAT PROTOCOL TO THE NEW AGREEMENT.

II

MR. MINIISTER, PROBLEMS REGARDING VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE MIRV LIMITATION OF THE NEW AGREEMENT HAVE NOT BEEN RESOLVED. ONE OF THESE PROBLEMS RELATES TO TYPES OF MISSILES WHICH HAVE BEEN FLIGHT TESTED BOTH WITH A SINGLE REENTRY VEHICLE AND ALSO WITH MIRVS. THE U.S. CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT, FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE NEW AGREEMENT, AN ICBM, SLBM, OR ASBM EQUIPPED WITH A MIRV SYSTEM MUST BE DEFINED AS ANY ICBM, SLBM, OR ASBM WITH A BOOSTER WHICH IS OF A TYPE THAT HAS BEEN FLIGHT-TESTED ONE OR MORE TIMES WITH A MIRV SYSTEM. THIS DEFINITION IS CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPH 6 OF ARTICLE II OF THE JOINT DRAFT TEXT.

THE UNITED STATES HAS EXAMINED THE OTHER ELEMENTS OF ITS POSITION ON MIRV VERIFICATION, AS CONTAINED IN THE PROTOCOL OF MARCH 5, 1975. TODAY I WILL PRESENT AND DISCUSS A NEW PROPOSAL FOR SOLVING THE PROBLEMS OF ASSURING ADEQUATE VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE MIRV LIMITATION. IF THE SOVIET SIDE ACCEPTS THIS PROPOSAL, THE U.S. WOULD BE WILLING TO WITHDRAW PARAGRAPH 3 OF ARTICLE V AND THE PROTOCOL OF MARCH 5, 1975, FROM THE JOINT DRAFT TEXT.

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THE U.S. PROPOSAL CONSISTS OF FOUR ELEMENTS. THE FIRST ELEMENT IS THE DEFINITION OF AN ICBM, SLBM, OR ASBM EQUIPPED WITH A MIRV SYSTEM, CONTAINED IN PADR JAPH 6 OF ARTICLE II. WE PROPOSE NO CHANGE IN THE LANGUAGE OF THIS PARAGRAPH.

AS THE SECOND ELEMENT OF ITS PROPOSAL, THE U.S. PROPOSES THE FOLLOWING REVISED LANGUAGE FOR THE BASIC MIRV LIMITATION OF THE NEW

AGREEMENT CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPH 1 OF ARTICLE V:

"WITHIN THE AGGREGATE NUMBER PROVIDED FOR IN
ARTICLE III EACH PARTY UNDERTAKES TO LIMIT LAUNCHERS
OF ICBMS AND SLBMS EQUIPPED WITH MIRV SYSTEMS AND
ASBMS EQUIPPED WITH MIRV SYSTEMS TO AN AGGREGATE
NUMBER NOT TO EXCEED 1,320."

THE FOREGOING LANGUAGE DIFFERS FROM THAT OF THE PREVIOUS U.S. PRO-
POSAL IN THAT THE PHRASE "LAUNCHERS FOR ICBMS AND SLBMS EQUIPPED
WITH MIRV SYSTEMS" IS REPLACED BY THE PHRASE "LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS
AND SLBMS EQUIPPED WITH MIRV SYSTEMS." THE NEW LANGUAGE IS
SIMILAR TO THAT OF THE SOVIET FORMULATION FOR THE DEFINITION OF
ICBM LAUNCHERS, WHICH I DISCUSSED IN MY STATEMENT OF FEBRUARY 18,
1976, AND AGAIN TODAY.

IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT THE SIDES ARE IN AGREEMENT AS TO WHICH
LAUNCHERS ARE CONSIDERED TO BE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS AND SLBMS EQUIPP-
ED WITH MIRV SYSTEMS, THE U.S. PROPOSES, AS THE THIRDED ELEMENT OF
ITS PROPOSAL, THE FOLLOWING AGREED STATEMENT:

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 SALT TWO GENEVA 0048

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"THE PARTIES AGREE THAT 'LAUNCHERS OF' OR SLBMS EQUIPPED WITH MIRV SYSTEMS AS USED IN PARAGRAPH 1 OF ARTICLE V, INCLUDE A LAUNCHER IF A LAUNCHER OF THAT TYPE HAS CONTAINED OR LAUNCHED AN ICBM OR SLBM EQUIPPED WITH A MIRV SYSTEM.

"FACTS WHICH COULD SUPPORT THE CONCLUSION THAT A LAUNCHER HAS CONTAINED OR LAUNCHED AN ICBM OR SLBM EQUIPPED WITH A MIRV SYSTEM WOULD INCLUDE, FOR EXAMPLE, THE PRESENCE OF AN ICBM OR SLBM EQUIPPED WITH A MIRV SYSTEM OR OF SUPPORT EQUIPMENT FOR AN ICBM OR SLBM EQUIPPED WITH A MIRV SYSTEM AT OR IN THE VICINITY OF THE LAUNCHER."

THE FOREGOING LANGUAGE WOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT, IF AN ICBM OR SLBM LAUNCHER HAS EVER CONTAINED OR LAUNCHED A MISSILE EQUIPPED WITH A MIRV SYSTEM, THEN ALL LAUNCHERS OF THE SAME TYPE AS THAT LAUNCHER WILL BE SUBJECT TO THE LIMITATION OF ARTICLE V OF THE NEW AGREEMENT. THIS WOULD BE THE CASE EVEN IF AT A GIVEN TIME A LAUNCHER OF THAT TYPE CONTAINED NO MISSILE OR A MISSILE NOT EQUIPPED

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WITH A MIRV SYSTEM.

IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT UNDER ARTICLE VI, NEWLY CONSTRUCTED LAUNCHERS OF MISSILES EQUIPPED WITH MIRV SYSTEMS BECOME SUBJECT TO THE LIMITATION OF ARTICLE V WHEN THEY ARE IN THE FINAL STAGES OF CONSTRUCTION. THE U.S. RECOGNIZES THAT, IN ADDITION, RULES OR PROCEDURES MAY BE NEEDED TO ESTABLISH AT WHAT POINT IN TIME IN THE PROCESS OF MODERNIZATION AND REPLACEMENT CERTAIN LAUNCHERS BECOME LAUNCHERS OF A TYPE SUBJECT TO THE LIMITATIONS OF ARTICLE V. SUCH RULES AND PROCEDURES CAN BE DISCUSSED DURING OUR CONSIDERATION OF THE PROPOSAL WHICH I AM MAKING TODAY.

THE U.S. BELIEVES IT IS IMPORTANT THAT BOTH SIDES ENTER INTO THE NEW AGREEMENT WITH A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING AS TO WHICH TYPES OF CURRENTLY DEPLOYED ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS WILL BE INCLUDED WITHIN THE MIRV LIMITATION AND WHICH WILL NOT. SUCH A MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING WOULD MINIMIZE THE LIKELIHOOD OF UNCERTAINTIES WHICH COULD LEAD TO DIFFICULTIES AND DISPUTES. ACCORDINGLY, THE U.S. DELEGATION PROPOSES, AS THE FOURTH ELEMENT OF ITS PROPOSAL, THE FOLLOWING AGREED STATEMENT :

"THE PARTIES AGREE THAT LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS AND SLBMS EQUIPPED WITH MIRV SYSTEMS CURRENTLY ARE THE FOLLOWING:

FOR THE UNITED STATES,.....;

FOR THE SOVIET UNION,..... .

THE PARTIES FURTHER AGREE THAT LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS AND
SLBMS NOT EQUIPPED WITH MIRV SYSTEMS CURRENTLY ARE
THE FOLLOWING:

FOR THE UNITED STATES,;

FOR THE SOVIET UNION,"

IN THE PROCESS OF FORMULATING THIS AGREED STATEMENT, THE U.S. SIDE
WOULD SPECIFY THAT ITS LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS AND SLBMS EQUIPPED WITH MIRV

SYSTEMS CURRENTLY ARE THE TYPES OF LAUNCHERS WHICH HAVE CONTAINED
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OR LAUNCHED THE MINUTEMAN II ICBM OR THE POSEIDON SLBM; AND THAT
ITS LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS AND SLBMS NOT EQUIPPED WITH MIRV SYSTEMS
CURRENTLY ARE THE TYPES OF LAUNCHERS WHICH HAVE CONTAINED OR LAUNCHED
ONLY THE MINUTEMAN II ICBM, THE TITAN II ICBM, OR THE POLARIS SLBM.

MR. MINISTER, TODAY I HAVE PRESENTED A COMPREHENSIVE PROPOSAL
WHICH I BELIEVE CAN ENABLE OUR DELEGATIONS TO MOVE NEARER TO COM-
PLETION OF THE NEW AGREEMENT. I WILL LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING
YOUR VIEWS ON THIS PROPOSAL.

END STATEMENT ONE.

BEGIN STATEMENT TWO.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON

MARCH 10, 1976

MR. MINISTER:

TODAY I WANT TO RESUME OUR DISCUSSION OF HOW ICBM LAUNCHERS
SHOULD BE DEFINED.

ON FEBRUARY 18, WHEN I LAST DISCUSSED THIS MATTER, I OUTLINED
AN APPROACH DESIGNED TO OVERCOME OUR DIFFERENCES IN THIS AREA.
THIS APPROACH CONSISTED OF TWO BASIC ELEMENTS: FIRST, AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE SIDES AS TO HOW TO ESTABLISH WHICH LAUNCHERS WOULD BE
CONSIDERED AS LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS AND, SECOND, AN UNDERTAKING BY
THE SIDES NOT TO GIVE LAND-BASED LAUNCHERS WHICH ARE NOT LIMITED
BY THE AGREEMENT A CAPABILITY TO LAUNCH ICBMS.

THE SOVIET DELEGATION, ON MARCH 2, PROPOSED THAT THE SIDES
ASSUME THE OBLIGATION NOT TO CONVERT MISSILE LAUNCHERS OTHER THAN
ICBM LAUNCHERS INTO LAUNCHERS FOR LAUNCHING ICBMS. WHILE I AM

PLEASED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE AGREES TO THE DESIRABILITY OF SUCH A PROVISION, THIS PROPOSAL WOULD NOT RESOLVE ALL THE PROBLEMS WE SEE IN THIS AREA.

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THE UNITED STATES CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SIDES ON HOW TO ASSOCIATE A TYPE OF LAUNCHER WITH A GIVEN TYPE OF MISSILE IS NECESSARY. THIS WOULD SERVE THE INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES IN AVOIDING FUTURE CONTROVERSY OVER WHICH LAUNCHERS ARE "LAUNCHERS OF" ICBMS. I CANNOT AGREE WITH THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE SOVIET DELEGATION ON MARCH 2 THAT THIS APPROACH "WOULD BE FRAUGHT WITH COMPLETELY GROUNDLESS MISUNDERSTANDING AND AMBIGUITIES." IN FACT, PRECISELY THE OPPOSITE WOULD BE THE CASE. AGREEMENT ON THIS MATTER COULD ONLY SERVE THE PURPOSE OF AVOIDING SUCH MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND AMBIGUITIES. IT IS THE ABSENCE OF SUCH AGREEMENT WHICH COULD LEAD TO UNNECESSARY DIFFICULTIES.

THE APPROACH WE HAVE TAKEN IS CLEAR AND OBJECTIVE. CERTAINLY THE FACT THAT A LAUNCHER HAS CONTAINED AN ICBM OR LAUNCHED AN ICBM COULD ONLY LEAD TO THE CONCLUSION THAT LAUNCHERS OF THAT TYPE ARE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS. IN THIS CONTEXT, THE FACT THAT AN ICBM OR ICBM SUPPORT EQUIPMENT IS LOCATED AT OR IN THE VICINITY OF A LAUNCH-

HER WOULD PROVIDE EVIDENCE THAT LAUNCHERS OF THAT TYPE HAVE CONTAINED OR LAUNCHED ICBMS. IT IS DIFFICULT TO CONCEIVE OF ANY REASON FOR SUCH ITEMS TO BE LOCATED AT A LAUNCHER UNLESS THAT
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LAUNCHER IS TO BE USED FOR ICBMS.

THERE COULD, OF COURSE, BE OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WOULD LEAD A SIDE TO BELIEVE THAT CERTAIN TYPES OF LAUNCHERS SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO LIMITS, AND NOTHING IN THE U.S. APPROACH WOULD LIMIT IN ANY WAY THE RIGHT OF A SIDE TO RAISE SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION.

IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT THE SIDES ARE IN AGREEMENT AS TO WHICH LAUNCHERS ARE CONSIDERED TO BE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS, THE U.S. PROPOSES THE FOLLOWING AGREED STATEMENT:

"THE PARTIES AGREE THAT 'LAUNCHERS OF' ICBMS AS USED IN PARAGRAPH 1 OF ARTICLE II INCLUDE A LAUNCHER IF, SINCE MAY 26, 1972, A LAUNCHER OF THAT TYPE HAS CONTAINED OR LAUNCHED AN ICBM.

"FACTS WHICH COULD SUPPORT THE CONCLUSION THAT A LAUNCHER HAS CONTAINED OR LAUNCHED AN ICBM WOULD INCLUDE, FOR EXAMPLE, THE PRESENCE OF AN ICBM OR OF SUPPORT EQUIPMENT FOR AN ICBM AT OR IN THE VICINITY OF THE LAUNCHER."

MR. MINISTER, IF THE SOVIET SIDE WILL AGREE TO SUCH AN AGREED STATEMENT, ASSOCIATING LAUNCHERS AND MISSILES BY TYPES, THIS WOULD PAVE THE WAY TO FURTHER AGREEMENT IN HIS AREA. MORE SPECIFICALLY, WITH SUCH AGREEMENT, THE UNITED STATES COULD ACCEPT AN ICBM LAUNCHER DEFINITION IN PARAGRAPH 1 OF ARTICLE II USING THE APPROACH PROPOSED BY THE SOVIET DELEGATION. WE WOULD ALSO, IN THIS CONTEXT, BE WILLING TO AGREE TO A SINGLE-PARAGRAPH-APPROACH PROHIBITION ON GIVING NON-LIMITED LAUNCHERS THE CAPABILITY TO LAUNCH ICBMS.

END STATEMENT TWO.

JOHNSON

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